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1.0. Introduction
In the academic literature, a number of studies have attempted to measure domestic 
market power in agricultural markets. Markets examined have included beef, pork, 
beer, cigarettes, coffee, fruits, rice and textiles among others. As McCorriston et al, 
(1995)  suggest  these  studies  have  been  more  frequent  in  North  America  and 
infrequent in Europe. Some recent examples have included studies by Azzam and 
Pagoulators  (1990),  Bhuyan  and  Lopez  (1997)  and  Quagrainie  et  al,  (2003).  
However, literature on agricultural market performance in many developing countries 
especially in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) is scarce and hard to come by. 
The performance of agricultural markets in Kenya has received little attention despite 
the critical role-played by the sector. Among the major staple Kenyan food crops is 
maize  that  accounts  for  about  20  and  25  percent  of  agricultural  production  and 
employment  respectively  (Kenya  2001).  Currently,  Kenyan  maize  consumption 
estimated at 3 million tonnes outstrips domestic supply at 2.3 million tonnes and its 
productivity has been declining prompting policy makers to questions the underlying 
reasons.  These concerns have prompted empirical enquiries that have attributed the 
production/consumption  gap  to  low  use  of  certified  seed  owing  to  marketing 
tendencies that price the seed out of reach for most farmers. 
About 30 percent of Kenyan maize producers continue using either traditional seeds 
(landraces) or recycled hybrids (Kamau, 2002). These seed use trends persist hand in 
hand with an established seed maize processing industry that is dominated by a few 
firms.  Moreover,  the  concentration  of  seed  processing  has  often  raised  public 
concerns especially given its inability to ensure lower certified seed retail prices. 2
The demand for certified seed maize in Kenya is derived from the consumption of 
maize that has been increasing in the country.  It is therefore expected that farmers 
would purchase certified seed to boost domestic production. However, the high seed 
maize retail prices in Kenya relative to regional SSA markets may be hindering the 
adoption of high yielding varieties. In 2004 for example, the seed retail to commercial 
grain price ratio stood at 10:1 when compared to Zimbabwe (5:1), Malawi (7:1) and 
Zambia (8:1) (Kenya, 2004). The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) estimated that seed 
processor margins accounted for about 20 percent of these prices in the same year. 
These pricing trends suggest non-competitive behaviour, which is indicative of the 
existence  of  market  power.  As  Quagrainie  et  al,  (2003)  reports,  market  power 
increases marketing margins, presumably at the expense of farmers and perhaps at the 
expense of consumers and this may be the case in Kenya’s seed maize processing 
sector. This study evaluates the structure of the industry and tests the hypothesis of 
price taking behavior.
Kenya’s  experience  with  the  marketing  of  certified  seed  maize  spans  over  four 
decades that have been accompanied by changes in the supply chain. Traditionally, 
breeding research has been the preserve of the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI).  KARI releases its publicly bred basic seed to seed companies who remit 
royalties  in  return.  Seed  companies  then  contract  seed  growers  to  undertake  seed 
multiplication.  The  companies  provide  the  growers  with  basic  seed  and  mutually 
agree on the price to be paid. Seed companies also appoint their own distribution 
agents and set retail prices and the margins to be received by agents. It is evident from 
this structure that seed companies have an upper hand in the marketing chain.3
The Kenyan seed maize processing industry is a 13 firm oligopoly that for a long time 
has  been  dominated  by  the  Kenya  Seed  Company  (KSC). KSC  a  quasi-private 
company inherited from the colonial times developed an extensive marketing system 
and enjoyed monopoly status until 1996 when the industry was liberalized. Typically, 
KSC sets the retail prices while other companies routinely adjust their prices to rhyme 
with  those  of  the  market  leader  in  each  growing  season,  which  might  suggest 
increased price coordination in the industry.
In  literature,  the  traditional  structure-conduct-performance  (SCP)  approach  to 
understanding market behaviour has been the method of choice in studying market 
conduct. However, in the recent past, many studies have opted for the New Empirical 
Industrial  Organization  (NEIO)  that  utilizes  structural  models  as  opposed  to 
profitability ratios that were prevalent in SCP approaches. The initial oligopoly power 
model developed by Appelbaum (1982) has since been applied on many other studies 
in testing for the existence of market power. 
As  Quagrainie  et  al,  2003  suggest,  the  common  approach  has  been  to  assume  a 
functional form for a dual cost function or a profit equation. The first order optimality 
conditions (Shephard’s or Hotelling’s Lemma) are then used to derive a system of 
input  demands.  In  these  models  firms  are  hypothesized  to  simultaneously  and 
independently choose their output levels given their beliefs about rivals reactions to 
their  output  choice  and  these  beliefs  are  called  conjectural elasticity  of  variations 
(Azzam et al, 1990). Azzam (1990) further argues that a firm’s conjectural elasticity 
is its conjectural variations multiplied by its market share.4
The conjectural elasticity of variations and the output demand elasticity are then used 
to compute a Lerner index that shows the degree of market power. A Lerner index 
value  of  one  indicates  presence  of  monopoly  power  while  zero  indicates  perfect 
competition.  The  estimated  econometric  model  consists  of:  an  output  demand 
equation  that  embodies  marginal  revenue,  input  demand  equations  that  embody 
marginal costs and a pricing equation (Bhuyan et al, 1997). The pricing equation is 
based on the profit maximizing condition that marginal revenue equals marginal costs 
and embodies a parameter of industry conduct. This approach has been applied by 
Lopez (1984) on the Canadian food processing industry and is used in this study to 
test for oligopoly power in Kenya’s seed maize processing.
2.0. Theoretical Framework.
This  study adopts  Appelbaum’s  (1982)  approach  to  measure market  power  in  the 
Kenyan seed maize  processing industry. An indirect dual cost function is  used to 
derive  the  industry’s  input  demands  (capital,  labour,  material  and  energy).  For 
convenience, we assume a single material input (grower’s seed) with all inputs being 
purchased in a competitive market by profit maximizing firms. We also suppose that 
the firm’s technology exhibit constant returns to scale and that the firm uses inputs in 
fixed proportions. 
Consider an industry in which N firms (indexed j = 1, 2,.., N) produce a homogeneous 
output (Y = certified seed) using M inputs: X = (X1,….,Xn). Let the cost function of 
the jth firm be given by;





j is the output of the jth firm and W is the price vector of the inputs. Since the 
firms are price takers in the input markets, Shephards Lemma can be used to derive 
the input demands;
(2)  X
j =  C
j (Y
j, W)/  W  j = 1,…N
Where X
j is the jth firms input demand vector. 
Consider the market demand facing the industry to be given by 
(3)  Y = J (P, Z) 
Where   Y
j  = Y (in this case demand is assumed to equal supply) and P is the 
output price (certified seed maize) while Z is a vector of exogenous variables.
The jth firm’s objective is to maximize profits by choosing the right amount of Y to 
produce given its cost structure.
(4)  Max {yj}  π
j  =  [ PY
j –  Cj (Y
j, W): Y = J (P, Z) ]
The necessary first order condition from the profit-maximizing problem is;
(5)  P (1 – θ
j / η) =  C
j (Y
j, W) / Y
j
Where θ
j is the jth firm’s conjectural variations elasticity and η is the absolute value 
of the price elasticity of output demand. The value of θ
j is a measure of price taking 
behavior and is used to test for the existence of market power. In a pure monopoly, θ
j
= 1 while in a competitive market θ
j = 0 implying that price equals marginal cost. 
Equation 5 can then be rearranged to derive the Lerner index a measure of the degree 
of market power as follows;
(6)  [P – MC
j] / P = θ
j / η6
Using market shares Sj =Yj / Y as weights, equation 5 can be written as;
(7)  Sj – [ SjMCj ] / P = Sj θ
j / η = Łj
where Łj is defines the jth firm’s Lerner index of oligopoly power. Under appropriate 
aggregating conditions, equation 6 can be summed up across all N firms to yield the 
industry aggregate Lerner index of oligopoly power (Ł)
(8)  Ł   =   SjLj = -H/  η
where H is the Herfindahl index (sum of the squared market shares). Equation 6 can 
also be aggregated to the industry Lerner index and rewritten as;
(9)  Ł  = [P – MC] / P = Θ 
/ η
where  MC  and  Θ  are  industry  level  (weighted)  marginal  cost  and  conjectural 
variations. The Lerner index shows the percentage difference between price and the 
marginal cost (indicating the level of the mark up) and just like Θ is bounded between 
0 and 1 where Ł=0 implies a competitive market while Ł=1 indicates a monopolistic 
market structure.
3.0. Estimation Procedures and Data
The industry’s cost function is assumed to be of the Generalized Leontief form while 
the  output  demand  is  taken  to  be  Cobb-Douglas  in  nature.    To  satisfy  industry 
aggregation, marginal processing costs are assumed to be constant across all firms 
while demands are assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero. To avoid singularity 
of the estimated covariance matrix that arises since the share dependant variables add 
up to unity, we drop one input (energy) and assume that the industry utilizes three 
inputs XL labour, XK capital and XM material input (growers seed). 7
Let the cost function be represented as;
(10)  C =  iWi  + Y   ij (Wi Wj) 
1/2,   ij = K, L, M
Additionally, a Cobb-Douglas consumer demand function is specified as;
(11)  Ln Y = α + ηLn (P/d) + γLn (Z/d)  + ξ Ln(Q/d) +  i .
Where d is the consumer price index, Z is the price of the substitute (commercial 
maize) and Q is per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is used as a proxy for 
expenditure. 
The input demands and the pricing equation in the model can therefore be given by;
(12)   XK/Y = KK + KL (WL/WK)
 ½ + KM (WM/WK)
 ½  +  k
(13)  XL/Y = LL + KL (WK/WL)
 ½ + LM (WM/WL)
 ½  +  l
(14)  XM/Y = MM + KM (WK/WM)
 ½ + LM (WL/WM)
 ½  +  m  
(15)  P =  (KL (WKWL)
 ½ + KM (WKWM)
 1/2  + LM (WLWM)
 ½)/ [1 + θ/ η] + p
In this study, we assume that θ is constant and hence θ = Φ and estimate a system of 
5 equations (11 through 15) with 11 coefficients.  
Since equation 15 is non-linear, the structural model is estimated using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach in the SHAZAM econometric software. We 
test the null hypothesis that H0: Θ = 0 and measure the index of industry oligopoly 
power as defined by Ł = Θ / η. In addition, Θ and Ł are hypothesized to be positive 
bounded between 0 and 1.8
The estimation included a constant for the output demand and a disturbance term to 
account  for  those  other  variables  that  may  be  relevant  in  explaining  these 
relationships.    The  output  demand  is  measured  as  the  quantity  of  certified  seed 
consumed based on the Marshallian theoretical concept that quantity demanded is a 
function  of  prices  and  income  and  is  adjusted  to  cater  for  measurement  and 
aggregation problems. Among the independent variables, per capita GDP was chosen 
to characterize individual purchasing power and hypothesized to positively influence 
the quantity demanded. 
The input demands are estimated as functions of relative prices. These factor demands 
are typically measured as shares of the total costs of production. However, since data 
on production costs was lacking, the factor shares were estimated as shares of the total 
value of production which proxies costs in this study. The factor shares were then 
specified as the cost of a particular input divided by the total value of production (total 
revenue). In the estimation, we assume that the cost function and the share equations 
are stochastic to account for technical and optimization errors respectively.
Own prices are hypothesized to have negative demand relationships while prices of 
substitutes  and compliments would  have positive  and negative effects  on quantity 
demanded respectively. The estimation of the pricing equation is nonlinear and is 
measured as a function of the marginal costs divided by one minus a ratio of the 
conjectural variations  elasticity to  the  absolute  demand  elasticity.   The  estimation 
process  imposes  symmetry  for  all  cross  price  elasticities  and  therefore  limits  the 
number of cross elasticities to equal the number of input demands estimated. 9
3.1. Data.
Annual time series data from Economic Surveys compiled by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Kenya (CBS) and the MOA reports for the period 1980 – 2000 was used in 
this study.  The Kenya Institute of Public policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) has 
compiled this data into an Agricultural Data Compendium. The data used in this study 
consists of the quantity of certified seed maize planted per year, industry sales of 
certified  seeds,  per  capita  GDP,  prices,  quantity  indexes  for  capital,  labour  and 
growers seed (material input) and a price deflator. All current prices are recorded in 
Kenya shillings per kilogram while agricultural wages are given per month. Interest 
rate data was collected from the Central Bank of Kenya.  
The  endogenous  variables  considered  included  the  consumer  demand  for  certified 
seed  maize  (Kgs),  input  factor shares  and  seed  retail  price.  These  constituted  the 
dependent variables for the 5 equations estimated.  The exogenous variables for the 
output demand included, own price, price of substitutes (commercial grain) and per 
capita GDP. All prices are deflated using the CPI (1982 = 100) and the equation was 
estimated in logarithmic form. 
The independent variables for the factor demands included own prices and relative 
price ratios. The factor shares were calculated as the cost of the inputs relative to the 
total value of output and the square roots of the relative price ratios were taken before 
estimation. The data is then split into two periods 1980 – 1995 and 1996 – 2000 and 
the levels of market power before and after liberalization of the sector are compared. 
However, the comparison between the periods before and after liberalized yielded 
insignificant results and is therefore dropped from the discussion of the results.10
6.0. Results
The estimated parameter coefficients, t - ratios and other relative statistics from the 
SUR regression model are presented in table 1. In general, the estimated own price 
demand relationships conform to economic theory except in the case of labour and 
capital  where  unexpected  positive  own  price  relationships  were  reported.  The 
asymptotic t-ratios also indicate that all own price elasticities for the consumer and 
input demands were significant at least at the 10 percent level. However, the cross 
price elasticities in all cases were insignificant while income elasticity was negative 
and insignificant perhaps due to the low levels of purchasing power in the country. All 
estimates were corrected for first order autocorrelation.
Table 1. Parameter Estimates of the full equation system.











Θ   0.702 1.109
Ł 0.453 -11
The  own  price  elasticity  of  demand  for  certified  seed  was  estimated  at  –1.549 
indicating  that  farmers  are  highly  sensitive  to  price  changes  and  any  small  price 
increase would drive them away from certified seeds. Perhaps the elastic demand 
could explain the low levels of certified maize seed use in the country in spite of their 
ready availability on the market. The sensitivity to price changes was compounded by 
the income elasticity that was negative but insignificant presupposing that certified 
seed maize is an inferior commodity. It is therefore not surprising that farmers in 
Kenya substitute commercial maize grain for certified seed maize though this cross 
price elasticity was not significant. 
The average conjectural variations elasticity was estimated at 0.702. This elasticity 
was  assumed  to  be  constant  throughout  the  entire  period  and  was  significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level. The hypothesis of price taking behaviour 
(HO: Θ = 0) is therefore rejected implying that the seed processing industry in Kenya 
does  not  behave  competitively.  This  elasticity  is  high  when  compared  to  those 
reported by studies such as Lopez, Schroeter, Azzam and Pagaulatos; and Bhuyan and 
Lopez. However, the current study may not be comparable to these studies because 
they analysed processed food industries in developed countries.
The ratio of Θ to η was used to compute the Lerner index that on average was 0.453. 
This index indicates a substantial degree of oligopoly power in the industry and is also 
significant when  considering  that Θ  is  significant.  The  Lerner  index  supports  the 
findings from Θ and is comparable to the estimates of the earlier studies discussed. 12
An analysis of the structure of the industry in 2004 by the ministry of agriculture 
indicated that the market leader (KSC) controlled over 86 percent of the market. In the 
same year, the leading four firms share of the market was 95 percent. These market 
shares indicate high concentration ratios and support the claim that the industry exerts 
market power. Unfortunately, market share data was only available for one year and 
as a result the concentration ratio (Herfindahl index) for all the years could not be 
computed. 
Table 2 presents the estimated factor demand elasticities. The material (growers seed) 
own price elasticity was estimated at – 0.719 and was significant at the one percent 
level.  The  negative  own  price  elasticity  conformed  to  economic  theory  and  the 
maintained hypothesis in this study. This inelastic demand may reflect the type of 
contractual arrangements that the processors make with growers.  
Table 2. Estimated Factor Demand Elasticities
a
Elasticity Capital Labour Material
Capital 0.928 -24.600 1.4870
Labour -0.0001 0.709 0.0263
Material 0.002 6.660 -0.719
a The rowsin this table should be read before the columns.
The own price elasticities for capital and labour were positive and significant at the 
one percent level. However, these elasticities had unexpected signs. The unexpected 
signs could be due to estimation errors though typically interest rates in Kenya have 
been high while labour is abundant and inexpensive.13
The cross price elasticities indicated that capital and labour were compliments while 
the two could be substituted for the material input but were insignificant. The input 
elasticities can further be used to illustrate the behaviour of the cost function. The 
concavity of the Generalized Leontief cost function is ensured by positive values for 
KM and LM.  Symmetry is imposed and confirmed by the signs of the cross partials 
while adding up is assumed.   Further, positive values for KK, LL, KM and LM
guarantee that the cost function is positive and monotonic and thus the cost function is 
well behaved. 
7.0. Conclusions.
This  paper examined  the market behaviour of  processing firms in  the seed maize 
industry in Kenya using the New Empirical Institutional Organization framework. A 
system  of  five  equations  was  used  to  estimate  market  consumer  demand,  input 
demands  and  a  pricing  behaviour  equation.  The  estimated  conjectural  variations 
elasticities and Lerner indices indicated that the sector was anti-competitive in the 
period under analysis. These findings give compelling evidence to conclude that the 
assumption of price-taking behaviour is inappropriate for the seed maize processing 
industry in Kenya. 
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